Dean: Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, and Professor of Economics, University of the Free State.

The Conversation is funded by the National Research Foundation and eight universities, including the Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Rhodes University, Stellenbosch University, and the Universities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Kwa-Zulu Natal, Pretoria, and South Africa.

It is hosted by the Universities of the Witwatersrand and Western Cape, the African Population and Health Research Centre, and the Nigerian Academy of Science.

The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is a Strategic Partner.

South Africans do not have a deep culture of coalitions.

There have been a few coalitions at provincial and municipal levels, but most of these were unstable.

The outcome of the 2024 national election up-ended 30 years of electoral dominance by the African National Congress (ANC), which received only 40.

18% of the vote, while the Democratic Alliance got 21.

81%, the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party 14.

58%, and the Economic Freedom Fighters 9.

52%.

This means that the country will need to learn to navigate coalition politics, a process that is challenging even under the best conditions.

All of this is happening in an economy that is not in good shape.

One possible outcome from ongoing talks is that the ANC partners with the radical Economic Freedom Fighters led by Julius Malema and with former president Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Party.

After 30 years of promises of a better life for all, millions of people feel excluded, left in poverty, with little means to take care of themselves.

Zuma and Malema have shown that they know how to capitalize on this sense of exclusion.

The second option is that the ANC partners with the biggest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance.

Disillusionment on the part of former ANC members who joined the Economic Freedom Fighters and uMkhonto we Sizwe makes coalition formation with the political left quite difficult.

And should it succeed, the economic consequences would likely be quite negative.

The Economic Freedom Fighters and the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party are not business-friendly parties.

A coalition with them would likely result in the alienation of investors, a further drop in economic growth, and consequently a lack of job creation.

On the political right, coalition formation between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance would be no less difficult, especially given their significant philosophical differences about the role of government and on how to overcome economic and social challenges.

Even if they were to succeed in forming a coalition, it would cause serious instability.

Such instability would not be conducive for investment.

Investors would prefer to stand on the sidelines and observe how such coalitions shape up.

The third option, of running a minority government, presents another set of challenges – in particular, the prospect of a very unstable government in a permanent state of gridlock.

Examples of minority governments can be found in various countries.

A coalition between the ANC and the Economic Freedom Fighters or uMkhonto we Sizwe is not as straightforward as it might look.

Founded a decade ago, the Economic Freedom Fighters have represented alienated, excluded youth, who feel the deal struck in 1994 doesn’t benefit them.

Malema was brilliant in mobilizing large numbers of young people.

Although his vote in this election waned somewhat, he still, broadly speaking, represents a cohort of younger people disillusioned with ANC policy.

And these voters will not necessarily like a coalition with the very same ANC unless it brings them a demonstrable benefit.

Anything less will cost the Economic Freedom Fighters support in future elections.

In the case of Zuma, it is a little more complex.

To understand his influence, we need to understand the man and the role he played in KwaZulu-Natal over almost 40 years.

In the early 1990s, before the first democratic elections, he played a key role in pacifying the bloody conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC.

And, from very humble, rural beginnings, via the anti-apartheid struggle and prison, he made it to deputy president of both the party and the country.

And then President Thabo Mbeki’s deputy president of the country following his implication in a corruption scandal.

But Zuma fought back.

And once back, this time as president of the party and the country, he mobilized KwaZulu-Natal in support of the ANC.

He remains influential in the province, as the recent election results show.

The uMkhonto we Sizwe Party garnered significant support.

His lifetime achievement was inspirational to many because, if a man from such humble beginnings could become president, then anything was possible for everyone.

As in the case of the Economic Freedom Fighters, it would not be so easy for the ANC to go into a coalition with uMkhonto we Sizwe.

They represent groups of people seriously aggrieved by the ANC.

They are angry and disgruntled.

If the ANC wants a coalition with these parties, it will have to offer them something that addresses their anger and disgruntlement.

But doing that would probably result in rising government expenditure and debt levels.

And if that coalition had to raise taxes to deliver on all the promises it made, investors would likely run away.

Given the leftist, statist views of both the Economic Freedom Fighters and uMkhonto we Sizwe, we might also see more interventionism, regulations, and unwise political support to state-owned entities.

South Africans have recently seen the private sector assisting the government in resolving the electricity, transport, and harbor infrastructure bottlenecks.

That would probably all come to nothing with this type of coalition.

A coalition between the ANC and the Economic Freedom Fighters or uMkhonto we Sizwe would likely be an economic disaster.

Either the ANC delivers on all the promises such a coalition will entail, which will be fiscally unaffordable and economically counterproductive, or if they try to contain the fiscal cost, and therefore not deliver on their promises, the coalition will fall apart and introduce further instability.

A coalition with the Democratic Alliance could take two forms.

One is a real coalition with the ANC and the Democratic Alliance, and possibly other smaller parties like the Inkatha Freedom Party, sharing cabinet positions.

However, for a party like the Democratic Alliance, this would hold the serious danger that if things were to go badly over the next five years, it would be seen as complicit and lose votes in the next election.

Should the Democratic Alliance nevertheless enter such a coalition, the government’s economic policy would pivot slightly more pro-market and possibly include a greater focus on frugality and efficiency in government.

But it would be difficult and time-consuming to carry out these sorts of measures with a reluctant senior partner.

The resulting frustration on the part of the Democratic Alliance would then likely cause the end of the coalition.

Such a coalition would be inherently unstable because the parties are philosophically quite far apart.

The second form of coalition between the ANC and Democratic Alliance entails the ANC running the executive branch of government and the Democratic Alliance running parliament – the so-called “supply and confidence” model.

Thus, the ANC leader would be president and appoint the cabinet with ANC appointees, and the Democratic Alliance might appoint the speaker or deputy speaker, and chairs of parliamentary committees.

It would presumably also include an agreement that the Democratic Alliance would support the budget and not introduce a no-confidence vote in the ANC-aligned president.

The ANC would have to negotiate support for each piece of legislation it brought to parliament.

This would result in very little being passed.

Without an agreement to support the budget and confidence in the president, the ANC would have little incentive to support such a coalition and might prefer to form a minority government.

A minority government would be very unstable as getting anything through parliament would be almost impossible.

If the annual budget isn’t passed, spending becomes unauthorized – a messy situation politically and economically.

None of the options on hand would be easy.

South Africans need to hang on to their seats.

It’s going to be a rocky five years.

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